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Abstract
This paper characterizes psych-predicates in Korean and possibly in Japanese, as opposed to English. We focus on the the
status of the Experiencer (or judge in the relativists term) in relation to other arguments (and higher attitude verbs) and 
examine the first-person subjectivity constraint, attempting to explain why a third-person subject is infelicitous with a psych-
predicate in PRESENT in Korean and Japnese as opposed to English. An evidence acquisition event before speech time is
claimed to be accommodated in English. Interaction between psych-predicates and direct evidential marker te in Korean is 
also examined. Relevant cause and effect relations and consequent coerced event functions are also postulated for coherent 
interpretation.
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
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1. Issues
with the third person subject in PRESENT (tense) fine, whereas its counterpart in
Japanese (J) and Korean (K) is odd unlike the first person subject utterance, as in (3)? It is because you have no way
at speech time. Few attempts have been made to explain this. We
aim to show that evidence acquisition (or learning) event is crucially involved in such a 1st person subjectivity 
phenomenon. It requires the 1st person s (Experiencer s) direct sensory or perceptual experience of one s own psych 
state or of the relevant type of individual object as in predicates of personal taste (PPT). The 1st person is the
starting point of all relevant and even exocentric expressions, with evidentiality factored in. (2b) even in English,
French and Chinese is bad if some denial or blocking of evidentiality such as (2a) (temporally) precedes it. An
evidence acquisition event (eev-acq) such as (1a), temporally preceding the psych proposition, must be accommodated
for explanation.
(1) a. I just heard from Mary. Or I just saw Mary. 
b. She is dizzy.
from Mary lately. Or
seen Mary lately. 
b. ?? She is dizzy.
(3) a. na-nun /?*kunye-nun/?*ne -nun ecirep-ta    (K)
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I-TOP   she-TOP    you -TOP dizzy-DEC  
s  
b. watashi-wa/?*kare-wa/?*anata-wa sabishi  desu  (J)  
I-TOP      he-TOP  you-TOP  lonely    (Kuno 1973) 
 lonely  
 
The PRESENT realization "she's dizzy" after past tense "I just saw Mary" is more like a consequence of double 
access  sequence of tense interpretation in English (a la Ezra Keshet s intuition p.c), i.e. Mary was dizzy *and* still 
is dizzy (see Sue said that Mary is dizzy/pregnant. ). First-person interoceptive psych judgments have the property 
immunity to error through misidentification (IEM, [19] dizzy or  exhibits IEM: one 
cannot commit an error in identifying the Experiencer of the dizziness or pain as other than oneself. In contrast, de 
se thoughts are different because they involve representing oneself as an object and in the course cannot be entirely 
free from an error.  
The PPT is treated with a judge parameter added to the evaluation index (of w, t) in a relativist position [8][21], 
as in [[fun]]c; w,t,j e. x is fun for j in w at t], or with explicit/implicit argument or an operator thereof 
[5][22][14][17] largely in contextualism. The dizzy type requires an Experiencer as an argument (typically Topic) 
and the PPT type also implicitly (if not explicitly) requires one with its individual object (Stimulus) prominent on 
surface. The judge parameter as an additional evaluation index must be costly and the denotational meaning of the 
predicate type of dizzy, tasty etc. must also be taken into account. Some Experiencer operator (as in Pearson) can 
bind a variable x on, replaced by other persons but, unlike 
Pearson, in view of a chain of evidentiality, with the source as the first person speaker. A simulation  approach 
sounds attractive but its overuse in its inexplicit stage may endanger grammar and semantics.  
An alternative contextualist approach with no parameters argues that the context-dependence enters in passing 
[4] 
expressed may vary from context to context, but once the proposition is fixed, its truth-
and no extra parameters need to be added to indices of evaluation [2][13][20]. Positing implicit content, this 
commonly employed linguistic strategy leads to contextualism (
clauses providing the implicit domains of various modals, as Partee [16] points out). The posited implicit content 
becomes part of the proposition expressed (or of the semantic content). This is relevant for propositional attitude 
ascriptions and for sentential anaphora, etc. Stojanovic [22] inherits some aspect of the Kaplanian view (1989) but 
departs from him in dealing with the above example of (A) [Mary says: I am dizzy.  (B) Bruce, pointing at her, 
after hearing her (=ee.a), says (1b) She is dizzy.  s view of Psych Predicates as properties rather than 
propositions leans to contextualism. Mary is asserting the content of dizziness of herself by saying I am dizzy,  as 
in (A). On this evidence, (1b) by Bruce (B) is possible in English. The content associated with (1b) is the very same 
function, and Bruce is asserting this content about Mary. But s view must be complemented by the 
licensing condition of an ee.a. The contents now become the same and the function corresponds to the property of 
being dizzy initially needing the first person. By having an operator that binds the variable for the first-person 
-
there is a language-specific evidential constraint that blocks the shift from (A B s
expression) in the PRESENT Sh PAST in J, K is 
relatively acceptable. This constraint must be represented.  
The 1st-person orientation is generally kept; an implicit Experiencer argument shifts to attitude holder co-
referentially in attitude report sentences such as (4). In (5 generally be the 
attitude holder Mary in English. The counterpart of (5) in Korean, on the contrary, tends to have the attitude holder 
Mary as Experiencer in the embedded S. Consider (6). Sentence (7) can be uttered only when the speaker as 
Experiencer has tasted the cat food directly because of the first-person constraint based on epistemic privilege. This 
where the speaker sees the cat eating a lot of the cat food, as in (7b, c) in Korean unlike in English, as in (5).    
 
(4) Mary thinks this cake is tasty. (Experiencer Mary)  
(5) Mary thinks this cat food is tasty. (Experiencer the ca 
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(6) Na-nun/Mary-nun [i koyangi-pap-i  mas iss-ta-ko]  sayngkak-hay   ((Experiencer I/Mary) 
I TOP/M-TOP  this cat-food  -NOM taste have-DEC think-do 
 tasty   
(7) a. i koyangi-pap-i          mas iss-e (Experiencer I in K) 
         this cat-food   -NOM tasty 
         is cat- (Experiencer the cat in English) 
      b. Ce koyangi-pap-i     mas iss-na po-ta  (Experiencer the cat in K) 
           that cat-food-NOM taste-have-seem-DEC 
           
     c. ?Koyangi-ka  ce koyangi-pap-ul  mas iss-e han-ta 
           cat-NOM     that cat-food-ACC taste-have do-DEC 
-food being tasty  
      
Interactions of psych predicates with the direct evidential marker te and other evidentials in Korean also pose 
issues. Their close association with de se is also touched on. This line of research is hoped to shed light on the 
distinction between the 1st person data vs. the 3rd person data [1], with the third-person data about behavior and 
brain processes, and first-person data  in the study of self and consciousness in 
cognitive science and philosophy of mind. My claim is that first-person data ultimately requires first-person 
subjective expressions at utterance time and that it must be thoroughly explained.     
2. Evidence Acquisition Accommodated 
The type of psych predicates requiring the Experiencer but not the Stimulus such as dizzy  cannot form a generic 
statement, as in  at least in J and K, whereas the tasty/fun type can, as in Walnuts are tasty, in J 
and K, too. The expression of Experiencers in a generic still has a 3rd person as its Topic (assuming it comes from 
the subject) and cannot be acceptable, although the 1st person plural Topic is slightly better because it includes the 
speaker, as in ??Wuri-nun ecirew-e [We-TOP dizzy-DEC] We are dizzy.  In contrast, a taste/fun predicate has a 
Stimulus as its Topic (coming from the subject). Therefore, even in these generic utterances, the starting point must 
be the 1st person singular. The 1st person singular Experiencer s (to me in English for PPT) domain seems to expand 
to the 1st person plural and then some we-like community. In particular, if Experiencers are backgrounded, the 
Stimulus Topic becomes prominent and the quantum properties of the Stimulus matter and we can think of some 
special physico-chemical properties of walnuts in general (or some sensori-motor physical aspects of riding a 
rollercoaster) causing some good taste (or fun) in my brain state via my sense organs reacting to stimuli. That 
should be why the Experiencer underlyingly takes a first-person dative (to me) in various languages in general, as in 
na-nun/na-eykey-nun   hotwu-ka   mas iss-e [eykey- DATIVE to ] [I-TOP/I-DATIVE-TOP walnut-NOM tasty  -
DEC] To me/I am, walnuts are tasty.    
Some psych predicates such as dizzy and boring tend to be stage-level-predicates but others such as tasty and fun 
tend to be individual-level predicates. Many psych predicates are dual in this respect. In causation structure, as in 
The book bored me -> The book was boring <- [Reading] The book was boring, with the purpose quale coerced as 
an event function a la Generative Lexicon Theory [18], it is a stage-level-predicate. But, if conditionally conceived 
(with genericity as a quasi-universal included), it tends to be individual-level. The PPTs tasty and fun can be 
extended to people in general, starting from the 1st person, with the second person includable. The Stimulus 
argument walnuts in general must be considered, too, for a generic; with the Experiencer backgrounded, it becomes 
a Topic and the associated PPT, tending to be individual-level, denotes its property. There arises a seesaw game 
between the Experiencer and the Stimulus. Generic sentences are Topic constructions and Topic has a conditional 
meaning with individual-level interpretation (also see Pearson [17]).  
Even in J and K, an Experiencer psych predicate is relatively all right in PAST with the 3rd/2nd person subject, 
as in (8):  
(8) (?) Kunye-nun/ne-nun ecirew-ess-e (K)  
she-TOP/you-TOP dizzy-PAST-DEC  
/You were  
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It is because some evidence acquisition (learning) event is assumed to have occurred before the speech time. Such 
evidentiality accommodation is universal but varies in different languages, depending on the source, type, and 
temporal relations factored in. In all languages the question What was your name?  (with appropriate intonation or 
markers) is possible in the interpretation of I had the  of hearing your name,  without the implication that the 
hearer changed his/her name. The past acquisition is encoded into the PAST marker.   
In PRESENT, however, some reportative (-tay in K; -soda in J)/visual (-e hay in K; garu in J) evidential marker 
is required to make the 3rd/2nd person subject psych predicate felicitous, as in (9). The visual evidentials e ha- in 
K and garu in J can co-occur with all and only subjective psych adjectives, whereas the reportative evidentials -
soda in J and tay in K can co-occur with all eventualities. In English, an immediately preceding evidence 
acquisition event for a third person subject psych adjective can be accommodated without any visual or hearing 
evidence explicitly marked unlike in J, K. All indicate that psych predicates require evidence acquisition event 
factored in for a non-first-person Experiencer psych predicates possible. In (9), the speaker heard Mary/someone 
saying that she/Mary is dizzy and reports it. At the deepest level, I am dizzy  resides with I  referring to the 
speaker in the context, hence de se, as in (6 ). Its immediately higher S may be: [Mary says [ I am dizzy ] and 
someone who heard it first-hand from Mary, who is the ultimate Experiencer, may say (9) as the speaker of (9), as in 
(9a), where i=PROde.se = cakii  reflexive de se, de se is conscious. Alternatively, someone who heard about Mary s 
dizziness from a second-hand source may also utter (9), in a grammaticalized interpretation of the reportative tay, 
like soda in J (Yasunari Harada, p.c.), as in (9b). In uttering (10), we see the evidence of signs or any behavioral 
appearance of Mary s direct sensory/perceptual experience, which I assume can be represented mentally, I am 
dizzy.    
   
(9) Mary-ka  ecirep-tay (K)  
      M SUBJ dizzy-REP (=REPORTATIVE)  
 
b. Mary is said to be dizzy.  (second or third hand)  
(9a) [s Maryi [s i dizzy] say] ( i=PROde.se = cakii  reflexive de se) (de se conscious) 
(9b) [s Maryi  is said [s i dizzy]] (second or third hand) 
(10) Mary-ka  ecirew-e ha-y (K) 
-  
 
 
In J and K, psych predicates in PRESENT with the 1st person Experiencer denote her psych state at utterance 
time only and do not allow for future or past reference (or topic) time expressed, as in (11). The topic time must 
continue (from past) to the utterance time, as in (12).  
 
(11) *Na-nun nayil/ecey/cokum cen ey ecirep-/sulphu-ta  
I-TOP tomorrow/yesterday/a while ago am-dizzy/sad 
             I am dizzy/sad *tomorrow/*yesterday/*a while ago.  
(12) Na-nun onul oncongil /yocum/ilcwuil cen-puthe/  kyeysok/naynay ecirep-/sulphu-ta 
          I-TOP  today whole day/lately/from a week ago/ continuously/all the time dizzy/sad 
      I am dizzy/sad all day long/ lately/from a week ago/ continuously/all the time.  [Intended] 
 
    
3. Interaction with Direct Evidential 
 
A quarter of the world languages including Korean have evidential affixes rather than words as in English. The 
nature of the direct evidential marker te in Korean also requires the first person speaker s direct perceptual 
 
It is interesting to note that this way of asking a name is sometimes used to address a total stranger diplomatically and apologetically, as if the 
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perspective and a shift of perspective to the speaker-to-be in interrogative sentences, unlike indexicals. The most 
direct perceptual evidence is implicated if te co-occurs with its prejacent without tense marking to denote the first 
speaker s witnessing the event in the proposition at-issue occurring at the same time as the of witnessing before 
speech. The Korean direct evidential marker te, implying the speaker s witnessing its scope proposition prior to 
speech time, cannot license a 3rd/2nd person subject psych predicate, unlike the PAST-marked (8). This interesting 
interaction between psych predicates and the direct evidential (and their close association with de se, realized as 
PRO or the reflexive caki, conscious or not) is examined.   
 
(13) a. Ivan-i     Maria-wa kiss-ha-te-ra 
              I-NOM  M-with  kiss-do-TE-DEC  
               Ivan kissed Maria, as I learned at that time  = e marker. 
                ___________________________ 
e       
 
t lllllll --------------- es              
 
ee.a 
                ___________________________ 
Fig. 1 
 
b. Pi-ka          o-ass-te-ra 
    rain-NOM come-PAST-TE-DEC 
             It had rained, as I learned later, [seeing the wet ground].    
          _________________________ 
e --- eresult 
 
t lllllll ------------- es           
 
             ee.a 
_____________________________ 
Fig. 2 
 
The occurrence of te with no tense marking can also denote the future event, as in (14). The evidence can be 
reading or watching the scheduled visit, as a signal event temporally connected to the future event, as in Fig 3. 
 
(14) Obama-ka     naycwu-ey        o-te-ra  
               O-NOM next week at come-TE-DEC 
Obama comes next week, as I perceived.  
______________________________ 
esignal  ---------------------------- e       
 
t lllllll ------------- es -----------llllllll----  
ee.a  
______________________________ 
                                    Fig. 3 
 
However, a psych predicate + te with the first person without tense marking cannot denote the speaker s future state 
of being dizzy; simply because dizziness cannot sensibly be scheduled or objectively foreseen. Hence, (15) is 
infelicitous.    
 
(15) ?*Nay-ka  naycwu-ey    ecirep-te-ra  
            I-NOM next week-at  dizzy-TE-DEC 
I am dizzy next week, as I perceived.  
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Otherwise, all occurrences of psych predicates with the direct evidential marker te in the explicit/implicit first 
past internal psychological state perceived 
prior to speech time. Psych predicates involve direct sensory/perceptual experience by the 1st-person at the core and 
the direct sensory/perceptual evidential marker te in Korean, which Japanese lacks, also involves the 1st-person at 
the core and they co-occur, as in (16). Psych predicates have overt or covert Experiencer but the direct 
sensory/perceptual evidential marker te cannot have a realized Experiencer.  Therefore, (16a,b,c) can have an 
optional Experiencer Topic (Na nun I-TOP ) at the beginning of each sentence. 
 
(16) a. Ku namwu-ka po-i-te-ra [visual]  
           The tree-NOM see-PASSIVE-TE-DEC 
.  
b. Kangdang-i          shikkurep-te-ra  [hearing]  
auditorium-NOM noisy-TE-DEC 
The auditorium was noisy.  
c.  Pipimpap-i         mas-iss-te-ra   [taste]  
     pipimpap-NOM tasty-TE-DEC 
.   
d. ney mal-i              mac-te-ra   [no psych involved (recognition of a proposition)] 
    your-words-NOM right-TE-DEC    
You were right, as I recognized,  etc.  
 
All the data here are first person data. The third person cannot be the Experiencer of these expressions, as in (17) 
and unlike (8).  
  
    (17) ?*Mary-ka ecirep-te-ra   
             Mary was dizzy at the time I perceived.   
 
We have one finer distinction between outer-directed and inner-directed in evidentials and psych-predicates in 
Korean, which we need, even though they may be considered in the same wider subjective experience category. My 
volitional act, unlike psych predicates, cannot co-occur with the direct evidential maker te. A psych sentence 
cannot take a non-1st-person subject if it co-occurs with the evidential maker te. With te, introspection is possible, 
as in (17), but outer-directed direct observation is odd, as in (18). A volitional act (18) with te shows exact 
asymmetry in possible subject persons. 
 
(18) ???Nay-ka pap-ul       mek-te-ra   
            I-NOM rice-ACC eat-TE-DEC 
            
 
On the other hand, there occurs a very interesting contrast between (19a) and (19b). By the direct evidential 
marker te (19a) asserts at-
observing it directly at that time, which after all turn out to be odd. Rather, the past tense marking of the same psych 
proposition at-issue is felicitous in (19b).  Because of the past tense, there could have been a time interval in which 
mentally simulating 
(Bergen ms)   
 
(19) a. *Ku-nun ecirep-te-ra  
              he-TOP dizzy-TE-DEC  
              
         b. (?)Ku-nun ecirep-ess-ta 
     he-TOP dizzy-PAST-DEC 
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In interrogative utterances, the perspective of the direct evidential te shifts to the hearer the speaker-to-be, unlike 
in declarative utterances. In this respect, -te is different from indexicals. Therefore, with PPTs or other psych 
predicates plus -te, interrogative utterances can take the 2nd person but not 1st or 3rd person, as shown in (20).   
      
(20) Ne nun/*na-nun/*ku-nun  hotwu ka mas-iss-te-nya? 
         you-TOP  I-TOP he-TOP  walnut-NOM taste-have-EV-Q  
          Did you perceive that walnuts are tasty to you/*me/*him?  
       
4. Concluding Remarks 
We started with and examined why She is dizzy  is bad in Japanese and Korean but not in English. Now we can 
explain it in terms of accommodated evidence acquisition events. We also attempted to explore Predicates of 
Personal Tastes as another type of psych predicates and the genericity issue. We tried to see interactions between 
psych predicates and the direct evidential marker te in Korean.  
Brain processes are 3rd person data [1] and even if I am observing Mary s dizziness in the brain I cannot utter 
(1b) She is dizzy  felicitously, at least in Korean and Japanese. First person data are truly internal to our 
consciousness and mind with the IEM immunity. Evidence acquisition events accommodated must support 
acceptable expressions with non-first person Experiencer examples in various languages and tenses.  
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